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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
DEPORTATION - JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTION OF IMMIGRA-
TION OFFICIALS-APPLICABILITY OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Weinberg, a Jew born in that part of Austria-Hungary which until
recently was Czechoslovakia, first entered the United States illegally
without inspection in August, 1927, landing as a member of a ship's
crew. Remaining in the United States until October, I931, he then
made a temporary visit to Poland upon a passport issued to him in the
name of Fliegelman, which he obtained by using the original copy of
Fliegelman's naturalization certificate. Upon his return to the United
States in May, 1932, Weinberg was permitted to re-enter without an
unexpired consular immigration visa under a claim of citizenship based
upon the above mentioned passport. In June, 1938, Weinberg was
arrested upon a telegraphic warrant charging him with entering in viola-
tion of section 213 of title 8 of the United States Code1 in that at the
time of his entry he did not have possession of an unexpired immigration
visa. Proceedings under section 214 of the same title2 resulted in an
order that Weinberg be deported. Weinberg then filed in the Federal
District Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court granted
the relief prayed for and ordered that relator be discharged from cus-
tody. U. 8. ex rel. T einberg v. Schlotfeldt, 26 Fed. Supp. 283 (938).
Since the warrant for Weinberg's arrest charged him only with
entering the United States without an immigration visa in violation of
section 213, the sole issue is whether the deportation order issued under
section 214 can be set aside by the district court. It is impossible to deter-
mine in what way the court reached its decision; the opinion makes no
direct reference to any case or to any statutory or constitutional provision.
However, it is submitted that the court has taken a very broad view of
' "No immigrant shall be admitted to the United States unless he has an unexpired
immigration visa .... " 8 U.S.C.A. 213(a).
"Any alien who at any time after entering the United States is found to have been
at the time of entry not entitled under this subchapter to enter the United States, or to
have remained therein for a longer time than permitted under this subchapter or regula-
tions made thereunder, shall be taken into custody and deported in the same manner as
provided in sections x5S and z56 of this title." 8 U.S.C.A. 254.
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its function and power in habeas corpus proceedings and has significantly
extended judicial review of the action of immigration officials.
Although it is expressly provided by statute that the decision of the
Secretary of Labor shall be final in deportation proceedings under sec-
tions 155 and 156,' which govern the proceedings under section 214,'
courts have exercised judicial review in both exclusion and expulsion
cases on a theory of interference with the alien's person.' The scope of
that review, however, is more limited than in the case of the decision of
other administrative agencies, especially where alienage is admitted.
Proceedings on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus do not constitute
a trial de novo either on the record or with the introduction of new
evidence, 6 and courts have interfered only where there has been either
(i) a denial of a fair hearing,' (2) a finding not supported by evidence,s
(3) an application of an erroneous rule of law,' (4) a claim of citizen-
ship made in expulsion proceedings,1" or (5) detention for deportation
for a reason not within the immigration statutes.11
Weinberg's admitted alienage and the clear predication of the order
of deportation upon section 213 rendered the last two of these grounds
inapplicable in the present case. The same is true of the first two. Re-
quirements of a fair hearing in deportation proceedings are less, and less
evidence is required to support the administrative findings, than in other
types of proceedings. Thus a denial of fair hearing is not established by
proof that the decision of the Secretary of Labor is wrong12 or against
the weight of the testimony." In the principal case the findings were
clearly supported by the evidence and the issue of a fair hearing was
not raised.
Nor does it appear that the officials erred in applying the law. Wein-
berg was not exempt from the requirements of section 213. A non-
quota immigrant may re-enter the United States after a temporary
absence without a visa. 4 But an alien landing as a sailor and remaining
in the United States is not, upon his return from a temporary visit
abroad, a nonquota immigrant within the meaning of subdivision (b)
'8 U.S.C.A. iSS, x56.
'See note 2, supra.
Van Vleck, THE ADMNIsTRATivE CONTROL oF ALmENS, (932) 149.
'Ibid. at 152.
Exedahtelos v. Fluckey, 54 Fed. (2d) 858 (1931).
8 Ibid.
'Ibid.
'o Ng Fong Ho v. Wite, 259 U.S. 276, 42 S.Ct. 492 (x92x).
"Gegow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 36 S.Ct. 2 (1915).
23 U. S. ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 13, 44 S.Ct. 26o (1923).
23
Ex parte Lee Soo, 293 Fed. 271 (1923).
1 4 Johnson v. Keating ex rel. Taratino, 17 Fed. (zd) So (1926).
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of section 2041" because his continued stay was illegal."6 Nor did Wein-
berg's marriage to an American citizen confer upon him any right to
remain.' 7 Moreover, neither the time limitation specified in section 155
nor any other applies to deportation under section 214 for unlawfully
entering without an immigration visa.'" Not only was Weinberg not
exempt from the provisions of section 213, but also he had dearly vio-
lated those provisions. It has been expressly held that an alien entering
under a passport fraudulently obtained by pretending to be a different
person entered in violation of section 213 and was subject to deportation
under section 214, even though in possession of an unexpired visa issued
in that other name.' 0 And in proceedings arising under section 155
deportation has been held proper in the case of an alien entering under
the unexpired passport of another"° or entering or re-entering by means
of false representation as to American citizenship." That the court
itself regarded Weinberg as clearly deportable within the provisions of
the immigration statutes is indicated by its expression of disbelief "that
the immigration laws contemplate any such strict compliance with the
letter thereof, as would compel the court to return a Jew to a country
where his property would be confiscated, where his life might be in
jeopardy . .. ,
Other bases on which the court may have intended to rest the deci-
sion are the Eighth Amendment, and arbitrary refusal on the part of
immigration officials to exercise discretion or to consider the merits of
Weinberg's situation. Though the latter basis is recognized, 23 judicial
intervention having occurred in cases involving the exclusion of minors
coming to relatives in the United States who were able and willing to
support them, '4 its applicability to Weinberg meets a two-fold obstacle.
The existence of any administrative discretion in the present circum-
stances is somewhat difficult to find. The language of section 214 would
appear to be mandatory, 2" and the discretion conferred by subdivision (d)
of section 2132' applies to admission, not to expulsion. Moreover, Wein-
"' "An immigrant previously lawfully admitted to the United States, who is returning
from a temporary visit abroad." 8 U.S.C.A. zo 4 (b).
" Ex parte Domcnici, 8 Fed. (zd) 366 (igz).
"U. S. cx rcl. Dombrowskiv. Karnuth, 59 Fed. Supp. zzz (937).
"U. S. v. Vanbiervliet, 284 U.S. S90, 5Z S.Ct. 132 (193).
x' U. S. cx rel. Fink v. Reimer, 96 Fed. (zd) 217 (1938).
2'U. S. cx rel. Faneco v. Corsi, S7 Fed. (zd) 868 (1932).
' U. S. cx rel. Volpe v. Smith, 62 Fed. (zd) 808 (1933); Ex parte Saadi, z6 Fed.
(Zd) 458 (1928). Contra as to entry, U. S. ex rel. lorio v. Day, 34 Fed. (zd) 920 (1929).
''U. S. ex rel. Weinberg v. Schlotfeldt, z6 Fed. Supp. 283, 284 (1938).
23 See Van Vleck, p. 187.
"' See De Sousa v. Day, zz Fed. (2d) 472 (1927).
21 See note 2, supra.
26 "The Secretary of Labor may admit to the United States any otherwise admissible
immigrant not admissible under clause (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) of this section, if
satisfied that such inadmissibility was not known to, and could not have been ascertained by
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berg violated clause (i) of subdivision (a) of section 213 and the dis-
cretion conferred by subdivision (d) does not extend to inadmissibility
under clause (i). And Weinberg must be deemed to have known of
his inadmissibility from his subterfuge in obtaining his passport. But even
if there was discretion in the Secretary of Labor to allow Weinberg to
remain, it is doubtful if the refusal to exercise it was such as would
justify interference by a court. In U. S. ex rel. Azizian v. Curran,"7
it was held that an Armenian was not so much a victim of religious
persecution as would authorize admission notwithstanding illiteracy.
There the denial of entry to an Armenian mother and her daughter was
held not such an abuse of, or refusal to exercise, the discretion conferred
by subdivision (o) of section 1362" as would justify interference by the
courts. While the Azizian case is distinguishable from the principal case
in several particulars,2" the conflicting inferences to be drawn from these
differences, together with the existence of a counterbalancing factor,3"
support a conclusion that the two decisions are inconsistent in attitude and
in their view of the function of the courts in habeas corpus proceedings.
The instant court appears to lose sight of the fact that on the merits the
decision as to whether an alien should be deported is for the Secretary
of Labor, not thecourt, to determine."'
While the opinion in the principal case does not refer expressly to
the Eighth Amendment, the court possibly had it in mind"2 when it
the exercise of reasonable diligence by, such immigrant prior to the departure of the vessel
from the last port outside the United States and outside foreign contiguous territory, prior
to the application of the immigrant for admission." 8 U.S.C.A. Z13(d).
27 12 Fed. (2d) 5oz (zq6).
2811 . . . The following classes of persons shall be exempt from the operation of the
illiteracy test, to wit: All aliens who shall prove to the satisfaction of the proper immigra-
tion officer or to the Secretary of Labor that they are seeking admission to the United
Sates to avoid religious persecution in the country of their last permanent residence. . .
8 U.S.C.A. 136(o).
29 The Azizias case involved exclusion whereas the principal case involves expulsion,
and there is some indication that the courts have greater power to review expulsion pro-
ceedings than exclusion proceedings. Compare U. S. v. Ja Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 25 S.Ct.
644 (i904-), with Ng Fong Ho v. White, 259 U.S. z76, 42 S.Ct. 49z (gz1). Also, the
Armenian in the Azizian case had spent the three years preceding her application for
admission to the United States in France where there was no persecution, whereas Weinberg
would be sent to Czechoslovakia in the midst of persecution.
so Offsetting the factors indicated in note z9, supra, is the fact that there was an
express statutory grant of discretion in the Azizian case (see note zS, supra), but none in
the principal case.
5 1 Ex parte Garcia, z Fed. Supp. 966 (1933).
52 The court recites and emphasizes facts that show that Weinberg had never been
on relief, had always supported himself, had never been arrested except for a traffic viola-
tion, and had never been guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude. These facts would
be relevant in proceedings under section i55 but the only relevancy to Weinberg's deporta-
tion under section 214 would appear to be in connection with the Eighth Amendment. The
court could not have in mind the prohibition of that amendment in the absolute sense, but
may have treated the deportation as "cruel and unusual punishment" in the relative sense,
that is, unduly severe considering Weinberg's actions and record while within the United
States.
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emphasized that "it would be cruel and inhuman punishment to deport
this petitioner to Czechoslovakia, belonging as he does to the race which
is thus being persecuted and exiled, especially when the charge against
him is that at the time of his entry he was not in possession of an unex-
pired immigration visa."33 If this language looks to the Eighth Amend-
ment, it is clear that the instant court has departed from the prior deci-
sions and has extended the scope of this constitutional provision. It has
been held that the punishment imposed for a violation of a statute, which
is within the punishment provided for by the statute, cannot be regarded
as excessive, cruel, or unusual,34 though there is dicta indicating that
courts might interfere with the Congressional function of fixing penalties
and punishments where such are clearly and manifestly cruel and un-
usual.3" Conclusive, however, is the fact that deportation proceedings
are of a civil nature, to which constitutional rights of the type guaranteed
by the Eighth Amendment are inapplicable;" indeed, there is an express
holding, where the alien pleaded the Eighth Amendment, that the
deportation of an alien is not punishment within the meaning of that
amendment.3" MYRON D. OLIVER
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
APPELLATE PROCEDURE - FINAL ORDER, ORDER GRANTING
NEW TRIAL NOT.
"In the opinion of the court, the courts of this state have gone the
limit in construing court orders as 'final' . . . and the attempt to make
the setting aside of a verdict and the granting of a new trial a final
order . . . violates the Constitution. . . " Thus wrote Judge Hart
in his opinion in the recent Ohio case of Hoffman v. Knollman1 which
reaffirmed the concept of finality as the touchstone of Ohio appellate
practice and set forth the rule that the principle could not be disturbed
by legislative definition.
The case involved an action to contest a will, wherein the jury had
returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant had filed a motion
for a new trial which was sustained. The plaintiff then appealed to the
Court of Appeals assigning as error that the motion should have been
" U. S. ex rel. Weinberg v. Schlotfeldt, 26 Fed. Supp. 283, 284 (1938).
" Hernandez v. U. S., IS Fed. (2d) 19o (1926).
" Bailey V. U. S., 74 Fed. (2d) 451 (1934)-
'6 Ah Lin v. U. S., 20 Fed. (zd) 1o7 (1927).
' Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 56 Fed. (2d) 566 (1932), affirmed without reference to
this point in 287 U.S. 341, 53 S.Ct. I5z (1932).
'135 Ohio St. 170, 186, zo N.E. (2d) 221 (1939)-
